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ABSTRACT  
 
Introduction: It is difficult to reason correctly when the information available is uncertain. Reasoning 
under uncertainty is also known as probabilistic reasoning  
 
Methods: We discuss probabilistic reasoning in the context of a medical diagnosis or prognosis. The 
information available are symptoms for the diagnosis or diagnosis for the prognosis. We show how 
probabilities of events are updated in the light of new evidence (conditional probabilities/Bayes 
theorem). A resolution is explained in which the support of the information for the diagnosis or 
prognosis is measured by the comparison of two probabilities, a statistic also known as the likelihood 
ratio.  
 
 
Results: The Likelihood Ratio is a continuous measure of support that is not subject to the discrete 
nature of statistical significance where a result is either classified as `significant' or `not significant'. It 
updates prior beliefs about diagnoses or prognoses in a coherent manner and enables proper 
consideration of successive pieces of information. 
 
Discussion: Probabilistic reasoning is not innate and relies on good education. Common mistakes 
include the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ and the interpretation of relative measures without consideration of 
the actual risks of the outcome e.g. interpretation of a likelihood ratio without taking into account the 
prior odds. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: prior odds, posterior odds, likelihood ratio, conditional probability, Bayes theorem, 
prosecutor’s fallacy 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
There is an implicit assumption in all that follows that uncertainty can be measured by probability.  
There is a very good argument that probability is the best measure of uncertainty (Lindley, 2014).  A 
clinician is uncertain of the diagnosis, given symptoms displayed by the patient or of the prognosis that 
follows from the diagnosis.   Uncertainty is colloquially presented in statements of likelihood.  For 
example, it may be stated that `it is very likely the patient has a particular disease' or `it is very likely 
that the patient will die within a certain specified time period'.    This paper assumes that such measures 
of likelihood can be represented numerically by a number between zero and one, a number which is 
known as a probability.  In other words, probability represents a measure of belief. 
There is a fundamental theorem underlying reasoning under uncertainty.  The theorem is Bayes' 
theorem, named after a nonconformist theologian, Thomas Bayes (1701 - 1761), who was a student at 
the University of Edinburgh and a Fellow of the Royal Society.   Bayes' contribution to science was 
two-fold.   First, he argued, as above, that uncertainty about the occurrence or otherwise of an event can 
be represented by a probability.  Second, he showed through his theorem how one's uncertainty about 
the occurrence of an event can be revised in the receipt of evidence or information of relevance to that 
event. These contributions are applicable to medical reasoning.   First, the event, about whose 
occurrence or not the clinician is uncertain, is a diagnosis or prognosis.   The information of relevance 
to this event is a symptom in relation to a diagnosis or a diagnosis in relation to a prognosis. Two 
examples show how these ideas work in practice.  Throughout these examples, the exact numerical 
figures are not important for the argument concerning the interpretation of evidence.  It is the underlying 
principle that is important. In both examples, the probability of an event is updated in the light of new 
evidence. Conditional probabilities are easily misunderstood and prior odds of an event should be taken 
into account when trying to interpret them. A common problem arising with interpretation of 
conditional probabilities is known as the prosecutor's fallacy (Thompson and Schumann, 1987) from 
its misuse on criminal cases where a small probability of finding evidence on an innocent person is 
confused with the probability that a person with whom the evidence is found to be associated is 
innocent.  
This confusion is not specific to criminal cases and this may be further clarified with the 
following comparison. 
 
If I am a monkey 
I have two arms and two legs 
If I am guilty my DNA 
matches that of a profile from a 
crime scene stain 
 
 
If I have the disease then the 
test result is positive 
If I have two arms and two legs 
am I then a monkey? 
If my DNA profile matches 
that of a profile from a crime 
scene stain, am I then guilty? 
If the test result is positive do I 
then have the disease? 
In all of these cases, the first statement in each column is true, assuming no false negatives.   
However, the answer to each of the questions in the second statement in each column is ` maybe'.    
 
 
Example 1:  Relationship of a diagnosis to a prognosis 
This example concerns the consideration of a prognosis given a diagnosis.   
• Prognosis: The prognosis is that a person will commit suicide.  This is the event about whose 
occurrence or not the clinician is uncertain.  Denote this event as 𝑆𝑆+.  The event that a person 
will not commit suicide is denoted 𝑆𝑆−. 
• Diagnosis: This is the information of relevance to the event. The information is that a person 
has been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder at least once in their lifetime. Denote this 
information as 𝐴𝐴+. 
 
It is possible to use measures of belief such as personal opinion, based on experience for 
example, as probabilities in the reasoning.   However, if data are available to inform these 
beliefs it is sensible to take advantage of these data.  For this example, the following data are 
available. 
 
Worldwide, at least one in three people in most countries are diagnosed with a mental disorder 
at some point in their life (Andrade et al., 2000). Prevalence of psychiatric disorders varies 
considerably across countries.  Thus, in what follows, figures more appropriate to a particular 
country should be used if that is felt necessary.  The figures used here are primarily for 
illustration.  Thus, the probability for a person of a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder at least 
once in a lifetime is taken to be 0.33 (as an approximation to one-third). Formulaically this can 
be denoted as 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴+)  =  0.33 where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 denotes `Probability'.   This is the uncertainty 
associated with the information of relevance to the event S, whether a person will (𝑆𝑆+) or will 
not (𝑆𝑆− ) commit suicide. 
 
Suicide (𝑆𝑆+) has an average population rate of 1.2 per 10000 in the United Kingdom (World 
Health Organization, 2014). This can be written, approximately, as  Pr(𝑆𝑆+) = 0.0001, hence 
approximating 1.2 in 10,000 with 1 in 10,000 for ease of explanation.  Uncertainty about 
whether a person will commit suicide or not is represented by a rate from a survey.  In the 
absence of any appropriate survey, the uncertainty can be represented by a measure of belief 
expressed as a probability. 
 
The interpretation of Pr(𝑆𝑆+) = 0.0001  is that, other things such as gender and environment, 
being equal, 1 in 10,000 people commit suicide and this is also interpreted as a comment about 
a particular person that the `probability of a person committing suicide (𝑆𝑆+) is 0.0001 or 1 / 
10,000'. 
 
Further studies in high-income countries have consistently found that at least 90% of those who 
commit suicide, have been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder at least once in their lifetime 
(Hawton and van Heeringen, 2009). This is a conditional probability of an event in light of 
some evidence (𝑆𝑆+ that one has committed suicide) and  may be denoted as Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+) = 0.9.  
This notation is read as `the probability a person has been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder 
at least once in their lifetime (𝐴𝐴+) given that (the vertical bar | ) they have committed suicide  
(𝑆𝑆+) is 0.9 or 9/10 or 90%. It is important to note that whilst 90% of those who committed 
suicide had been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder at least once in their lifetime it is not 
the case that 90% of those who have been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder at least once 
in their lifetime will commit suicide.   However, the probability of interest for the diagnostician 
is not the probability that person who has committed suicide has been diagnosed with a 
psychiatric disorder.  It is the transpose of this, namely the probability a person will commit 
suicide if they have been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder at least once in their lifetime. 
Given the probabilities above, this probability of interest can be determined. The information 
available is listed below. 
 
• 𝑆𝑆+:  a person will commit suicide; 
• 𝑆𝑆−:  a person will not commit suicide; 
• 𝐴𝐴+:  a person has been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder at least once in their lifetime 
• Pr(𝐴𝐴+) = 0.33; 
• Pr(𝑆𝑆+) = 0.0001; 
• Pr(𝑆𝑆−) = 0.9999.  The two events `will commit suicide' and `will not commit suicide' are what 
is known as `mutually exclusive and exhaustive events'.   They are mutually exclusive since 
one cannot both commit suicide and not commit suicide.   They are exhaustive as one cannot 
partially commit suicide, either one does or one does not.   Thus, one or other of 𝑆𝑆+ and 𝑆𝑆− is 
certain to occur and hence Pr(𝑆𝑆+ 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆−) = Pr(𝑆𝑆+) + Pr(𝑆𝑆−) = 1.  The corresponding 
general result is that the sum of the probabilities of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events 
is 1. 
 
• Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+) = 0.9. 
 
The probability of interest is the probability that a person who has been diagnosed with a 
psychiatric disorder will commit suicide.   This is Pr (𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+).   It is known that 33% (or 
probabilistically Pr (𝐴𝐴+)) of the population have a psychiatric disorder. The probability of 
interest is the proportion of those that will commit suicide. It is known that 0.01% (Pr (𝑆𝑆+)) of 
the population will commit suicide and of that 0.01%, 90% (Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+)) will have been 
diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder.   Thus 90% of 0.01% have both committed suicide and 
been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder, denoted Pr (𝐴𝐴+ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆+).  We are interested in the 
proportion of the population with diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder that will commit suicide. 
The probability of interest can be calculated using Bayes theorem1 , with C in the 
footnote replaced by S+ and D in the footnote replaced by A+’,as 
Pr(𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+) = Pr (𝐴𝐴+ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆+)Pr (𝐴𝐴+) = Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+)  × Pr (𝑆𝑆+)Pr (𝐴𝐴+) = 0.99 × 0.00010.33 ≅ 0.00027 
The general result concerning mutually exclusive and exhaustive events applies to events 
conditioned on other events.   In this example the conditioning event is A and Pr(𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴) +Pr(𝑆𝑆−|𝐴𝐴+) = 1 and so Pr(𝑆𝑆−|𝐴𝐴) = 1 − Pr(𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+) = 0.99973. Figure 1 shows a probability 
tree diagram for this example.  
  
 The probability 0.00027 (or 0.027%) should be compared with that of 90% for the proportion 
of those who committed suicide that had been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder at least 
once in their lifetime.   The error of confusing Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+) with Pr (𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+) is known as the 
prosecutor's fallacy (Thompson and Schumann, 1987).  
  
 The result 
 
                                                 
1 Bayes theorem describes the probability of an event, e.g. 𝐶𝐶, based on prior knowledge, e.g. 
event 𝐷𝐷, of conditions that might be related to the event 𝐶𝐶. This is represented formulaically as 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶|𝐷𝐷) = Pr (𝐷𝐷|𝐶𝐶)×𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶)
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷)  
Pr(𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+) = Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+)  × Pr (𝑆𝑆+)Pr (𝐴𝐴+)  
 
applies to 𝑆𝑆− also. 
 Pr(𝑆𝑆−|𝐴𝐴+) = Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆−)  × Pr (𝑆𝑆−)Pr (𝐴𝐴+)  
 
 
Division of the result for 𝑆𝑆+ by the result for 𝑆𝑆− gives a result known as the odds form of 
Bayes' theorem.                                     Pr�𝑆𝑆+�𝐴𝐴+�
Pr�𝑆𝑆−�𝐴𝐴+�
= Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+)
Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆−) × Pr (𝑆𝑆+)Pr (𝑆𝑆−)                           (1) 
, where the common term Pr (𝐴𝐴+) cancels out. 
 
This result demonstrates the updating of the prior odds 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆+)/𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆−) in favour of a 
prognosis 𝑆𝑆+ (odds prior to information related to the event) to posterior odds Pr(𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+) / Pr(𝑆𝑆−|𝐴𝐴+) in favour of the prognosis in the light of information A.  The ratio Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+) /Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆−) is known as the likelihood ratio (LR).  It is the factor which updates 
prior odds Pr(𝑆𝑆+) /Pr (𝑆𝑆−) in favour of an event to posterior odds Pr(𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+) / Pr(𝑆𝑆−|𝐴𝐴+)   in 
favour of an event in the light of new information and it may be thought of as the value of the 
information. A LR greater than 1 supports one proposition and a LR less than 1 supports the 
other.  The closer LR is to 1 (either less than or greater than 1) the weaker the support for the 
event e.g. for 𝑆𝑆+ (LR > 1) or for 𝑆𝑆− (LR < 1)   
 
Equation (1) can also be expressed as  
 
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 = 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 × 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝. 
 
It is possible with a rearrangement of (1) to determine Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆−) and hence the LR. 
 Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆−) = Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+)×Pr(𝑆𝑆+)×Pr(𝑆𝑆−|𝐴𝐴+)
Pr(𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+)×Pr(𝑆𝑆−) = 0.9×0.0001×0.999730.00027×0.9999 = 0.3332767. 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+)Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆−) = 0.90.3332767 = 2.7. 
 
 
Verbally this result maybe expressed as follows.  The odds in favour of committing suicide for 
a member of the general population (prior odds) are 1 in 9999. More specifically, Pr (𝑆𝑆+)
Pr (𝑆𝑆−) =
1
1000�
999
1000�
 . If such a person has a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder, the odds in favour of 
committing suicide (posterior odds) increase by a factor of 2.7. 
 
One may argue that the posterior odds are increased by a factor of 170% (from 1 in 9999 to 2.7 
in 9999). This result may appear impressive but the increase is from a very small number to 
another very small number. Relative measures are very informative in comparing an event 
across two groups (diagnosed vs non-diagnosed) but they do not reveal any information about 
the likelihood or the odds of the event in the two groups. Suicides are rare and the probability 
of suicide is still very small regardless of the diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder. Given an LR 
of 2.7 and in order for the posterior odds to exceed one (so that it is more likely for a person to 
commit suicide, than not commit suicide given a diagnosis  with a mental disorder), prior odds 
should be at least 0.37 (because 0.37 × 2.7 = 1) which equates to an absolute risk of 
committing suicide at least equal to 0.27 ( 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆+) ≥ 0.27), which is certainly an unrealistic 
probability for a person in the general population about whom nothing is known to commit 
suicide. All the probabilistic measures entertained in this example are presented in Table 1. 
 
Example 2:  Relationship of a symptom to a diagnosis 
 
It is also possible using the same arguments and relationships such as the odds version of Bayes' 
theorem to update the probability a person has schizophrenia (a diagnosis) given evidence of a 
symptom.  The example presented here uses diagnostic test accuracy studies (Takwoingi, Riley 
and Deeks, 2015) and a blood-based laboratory test for the diagnosis of schizophrenia (Schwarz 
et al., 2010). This test has a sensitivity (proportion of confirmed schizophrenia cases correctly 
identified by the test) and specificity (proportion of confirmed non-schizophrenia cases 
correctly identified by the test) that are both equal to 0.83.  For comparison with the ideas given 
in Example 1:   
 
• Diagnosis: The diagnosis is that a person has schizophrenia.  This is the event about 
whose occurrence or not the clinician is uncertain.  Denote this event as 𝑆𝑆+.   The 
event that a person will not have schizophrenia is denoted 𝑆𝑆−.   
• Symptom:   This is the information of relevance to the event. The symptom is the 
result of the laboratory test.  In contrast to example 1, a distinction is drawn between 
a positive result, denoted 𝐴𝐴+, and a negative result, denoted 𝐴𝐴−.   
 
The information available is summarised below. 
 
• 𝑆𝑆+: a person has schizophrenia; 
• 𝑆𝑆−: a person does not have schizophrenia; 
• 𝐴𝐴+: the laboratory test has a positive result;  
• 𝐴𝐴−:  the laboratory test has a negative result. 
• 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆+): sensitivity, the probability a person with schizophrenia has a positive test 
result, here equal to 0.83;  
• Pr (𝐴𝐴−|𝑆𝑆−):  specificity, the probability a person without schizophrenia has a negative 
test result, here equal to 0.83;  
• Pr(𝑆𝑆+) = 0.005 the proportion of the population diagnosed with schizophrenia 
(World Health Organization, 2014) 
• Pr(𝑆𝑆−) = 0.995: The two events `has schizophrenia' and `does not have 
schizophrenia' are mutually exclusive and exhaustive events.   Thus  Pr(𝑆𝑆−) = 1 −Pr (𝑆𝑆+).   
 
The probability a non-psychotic patient (one without schizophrenia) has a negative test result 
is 0.83.  Thus, the probability this non-psychotic patient has a positive test result is  Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝑆𝑆−) = 0.17. (Tests are assumed to have only two possible outcomes, positive and 
negative, which are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  No results are inconclusive.)   
Similarly, the probability a psychotic patient has a negative test, Pr(𝐴𝐴−|𝑆𝑆+) = 0.17. 
 
The overall proportion of the population that respond positively to the test is 83% of the 0.5% 
that have schizophrenia and 17% of the 99.5% that do not.   This proportion is 17.33% of the 
population ((0.83 × 0.005 + 0.17 × 0.995) × 100).   Of that 17.33%, the number that 
respond positively, the number that have both schizophrenia and a positive test result, is 0.5% 
of 83% or 0.415%, a proportion 0.415/17.33 (0.024 or 2.4%) of the population that respond 
positively to the test.  Similarly, of that 17.33%, the number that do not have schizophrenia but 
do have a positive test result, is 99.5% of 17% or 16.915%, a proportion 16.915/17.33 or 97.6% 
of the population that respond positively to the test and do not have schizophrenia. The initial 
proportion of the population with schizophrenia was 0.5%.  The additional information of a 
positive test result has raised this proportion to 2.4% or an increase by a factor of 4.8.  The 
factor can be shown to be the ratio of sensitivity to (1 - specificity) (0.83/0.17 = 4.79) and is 
known as a positive likelihood ratio in diagnostic test studies2. It represents the increase in odds 
favouring the outcome (e.g. schizophrenia) given a positive test result. A positive test result is 
4.79 times as likely for a psychotic patient as for a non-psychotic one. LRs greater than one 
indicate that the test result is associated with the condition. This result can be shown 
mathematically using the odds form of Bayes theorem (1) where the notation refers to Example 
2. Prior and posterior odds are also called pre-test and post-test odds in diagnostic studies.  
Hence 
 Pr (𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴)Pr (𝑆𝑆−|𝐴𝐴) = Pr (𝐴𝐴|𝑆𝑆+)Pr (𝐴𝐴|𝑆𝑆−) × Pr (𝑆𝑆+)Pr (𝑆𝑆−) = 0.830.17 × 0.0050.995 = 4.79 × 0.005 = 0.00415/0.16195= 0.024 
 
Addition of an additional and independent test 
 
Consider a second test for schizophrenia independent of the second test, again with sensitivity 
and specificity 0.83, independent of the first test.   Denote a positive result of this test as 𝛣𝛣+ 
and a negative result as 𝛣𝛣−.   As with test 𝐴𝐴, Pr(𝐵𝐵+|𝑆𝑆+) = Pr(𝐵𝐵−|𝑆𝑆−) = 0.83 and Pr(𝐵𝐵+|𝑆𝑆−) = Pr (𝐵𝐵 − |𝑆𝑆+= 0.17). The proportion of people with positive test results for both 
A and for B is not the product of the proportion of people with a positive test result for A and 
the proportion of people with a positive test result for B. 
 
A person gives a positive result for both tests.   The probability of interest is still that the person 
has schizophrenia.  It has been shown that for a positive result for test 𝐴𝐴, the probability is 
0.024.   For two positive results from independent tests with the same specificities and 
sensitivities of 0.83, the probability a person has schizophrenia is not 0.0242 or 0.0006.  
Mathematically, Pr (𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+,𝐵𝐵+) ≠ Pr (𝑆𝑆+|𝐴𝐴+) × Pr (𝑆𝑆+|𝐵𝐵+). Such a result would suggest 
additional positive results led to a decrease in the probability of schizophrenia.  An explanation 
as to why this is not so is given in the following paragraph. 
  
For those with a positive result to the first test, only 2.4% of the population have schizophrenia.   
Thus, the overall proportion of the population that respond positively to the second test as well 
as positively to the first test is 83% of the 2.4% that have schizophrenia and 17% of the 97.6% 
that do not.   This is 18.6% of the population ((0.83 × 0.024 + 0.17 × 0.976) × 100).   Of 
that 18.6%, the number that have both schizophrenia and a positive test result to both tests is 
2.45% of 83% which equals approximately 10% (0.83 x 0.024/0.186 = 0.107. The initial 
proportion of the population with schizophrenia was 0.5%.  The additional information of a 
first positive test result has raised this proportion to 2.4% or an increase by a factor of 4.9.  A 
positive result to a second test, independent of the first raises the proportion to 10%.  The 
probability a person with positive result to both tests has schizophrenia is 10%, compared with 
the base rate 0.5%, an increase by a factor of 20. 
 
 
Comparison with the evaluation of evidence in criminal justice 
 
Similar arguments to those in these two examples occur in the evaluation and interpretation of 
evidence in forensic science in the administration of criminal justice.   Instead of presence or 
absence of a disease (e.g. schizophrenia) or the fulfilment or not of a prognosis (suicide), there 
                                                 
2 All likelihood ratios are positive. In the context of our example, a diagnostic test accuracy 
study, a positive likelihood ratio is a standard terminology that refers to the increase in odds 
favouring the outcome given a positive test result 
 
are two propositions, put simply as the defendant is guilty or the defendant is innocent.   In this 
context, these propositions are those of true guilt and true innocence, not the verdicts 
`Guilty' or `Not guilty' of a jury. Instead of the test result (positive or negative) or the diagnosis 
(psychiatric disorder) there is scientific evidence. Consider evidence that the DNA profile of a 
defendant matches in some sense that of a blood stain found at a crime scene.   If the defendant 
were innocent, this match would be fortuitous and the probability of a match by chance would 
be very small.   The probability of finding the evidence of a match if the defendant is innocent 
is very small.   However, this probability is not to be equated to the probability that the 
defendant is innocent if there is a match of DNA profiles.  More generally, the probability of 
innocence for someone on whom incriminating evidence has been found is not the same as the 
probability of incriminating evidence being found on a person who is innocent.  The claim that 
these two probabilities are equal is another example of the prosecutor's fallacy (Thompson and 
Schumann, 1987). Similarly, a large probability of a positive test result for someone who has a 
disease should not be equated to a large probability that a person with a positive test result has 
the disease. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Probabilistic reasoning is not innate and relies on good education. The effects of a diagnosis on 
a prognosis and of a symptom on a diagnosis are discussed using an approach based on an LR.   
The LR provides a continuous measure of support for one proposition (prognosis or diagnosis) 
based on an event (diagnosis or symptom).      It is also shown how to combine the results from 
two independent events. Notice that the LR is said to provide support for one proposition over 
another. The LR does not comment on the truth or otherwise of a particular proposition.  In 
order to do that, knowledge of the prior odds Pr(𝑆𝑆+)
Pr(𝑆𝑆−)  is needed. In a similar spirit, lots of medical 
journals, including BMJ, require that along with relative measures (e.g. relative risks), absolute 
measures of the event in each group (absolute risks) should be reported. 
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 Table 1: Interpretation and formulae for various probabilistic measures. We use upper indices + and – 
to denote whether event A happens or not. For event B we assume that is always happen and we omit 
the upper index. 
 
 
Measure  Interpretation  Formula  
Probability (e.g. of an event 
𝐴𝐴+).  
A measure of the likelihood of 
an event. It takes a number 
between 0 (impossible) and 
1(certain) 
Pr (𝐴𝐴+) 
Probability of a 
complementary event (e.g. 𝐴𝐴−) 
A measure of the likelihood 
that an event will not occur 
Pr(𝐴𝐴−) = 1 − Pr (𝐴𝐴+) 
Conditional probability (e.g. of 
an event A given an event B) 
A measure of the likelihood of 
an event (e.g. A) given that 
another event (e.g. B) has 
occurred 
Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝐵𝐵) 
Bayes theorem Bayes theorem describes the 
probability of an event, e.g. 
𝐴𝐴+, based on prior 
knowledge, e.g. event 𝐵𝐵, of 
conditions that might be 
related to the event 𝐴𝐴+.  
Pr(𝐴𝐴+|𝐵𝐵)= Pr (𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴+) × Pr (𝐴𝐴+)Pr (𝐵𝐵)  
Prior Odds (e.g. of an event A) The odds in favour of A; the 
probability A will occur 
divided by the probability it 
will not occur.  
𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 = Pr (𝐴𝐴+)Pr (𝐴𝐴−)= Pr (𝐴𝐴+)1 − Pr (𝐴𝐴+) 
Posterior Odds (e.g. of an 
event A given that B has 
occurred) 
The odds of A in light of B; the 
probability A will occur given 
B has occurred divided by the 
probability A will not occur 
given that B has occurred. 
They inform us how odds of A 
have been updated given that B 
has occurred. 
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 = Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝐵𝐵)Pr (𝐴𝐴−|𝐵𝐵)= Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝐵𝐵)1 − Pr (𝐴𝐴+|𝐵𝐵) 
Likelihood Ratio The factor which updates prior 
odds in favour of an event (e.g. 
A+) to posterior odds in favour 
of an event in the light of new 
information (e.g. B). 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴+)
𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴−) 
 
